NYC: Transport chief pushes more livable city, but faces anti-rail BRT “booby trap” – From the Light Rail Now Folks

Ominous news for the Fraser Valley efforts to reinstate the interurban, as it seems New York City’s transit planners are going against the world trend in building with LRT and instead is planning for Bus Rapid Transit or BRT. What a coincidence that TransLink’s new CEO, comes from New York City and its long established transit bureaucracy. Is the fix in to build BRT into the valley instead of light rail?

Proposed BRT in New York City - compare with LRT grassed ROW's!

Light Rail Now! NewsLog
2 July 2009
Updated 2009/07/02

NYC: New transport chief pushes more livable city, but anti-rail “BRT” campaign could be “booby trap”

New York City: For at least three-quarters of a century, this and other great American cities have catered to private automobile transportation at the expense of pedestrians, cyclists, and public transit riders. Now, in New York at least, this may be changing.

Janette Sadik-Khan, appointed head of the NYC Department of Transportation in 2007, is revolutionizing the way a city, and especially New York City, can approach transportation particularly by spearheading an effort to make the streets of New York livable by adding bike lanes throughout the city, setting aside areas for people to walk and sit, and designating lanes for bus transit.

Sadik-Khan created “Summer Streets”, whereby Park Avenue between 72nd Street and the Brooklyn Bridge was shut down for three weekends during the summer and completely taken over by … people. Amazing!

These measures are part of a strategic plan the department produced called “Sustainable Streets.” According to Sadik-Khan, transportation departments have traditionally been focused on moving vehicles around, and she believes their new goal should be to provide the highest quality of urban life. She says that we need to take a “fresh look” at our streets and streetscapes and how we use them.

All of the measures implemented so far have resulted in widespread enthusiastic response by the public.

Streetfilms has put together the following video interview to highlight what she has done.

http://bikeportland.org/2008/10/27/a-video-and-a-visit-from-nycs-dot-commissioner/

Ironically, although Sadik-Khan is chairman of the strongly pro-light rail/pro-streetcar orgainzation Reconnecting America, she’s gotten ensnared in a major offensive by the “Bus Rapid Transit” (“BRT”) wing of the highway/motor vehicle industry (and within the Metropolitan Transportation Authority) to push “BRT” throughout NYC to some extent, in opposition to rail transit alternatives, including the Second Avenue Subway project. Despite the solid successes of electric light rail transit (LRT) just across the Hudson River in Newark and the Hudson-Bergen LRT system serving New Jersey communities such as Bayonne, Jersey City, Hoboken, and Weehawken and, indeed, the phenomenal successes of new LRT starts in cities like Minneapolis, Charlotte, and Phoenix (in contrast to the comparatively lackluster performance of new “BRT” operations in several cities) a propaganda blitz has been under way in NYC to portray rail transit as largely a failure, and “BRT” as some kind of phenomenal savior of the American transit industry (a reverse-image fantasy backed by a barrage of fabricated claims and largely imaginary “facts”).

Thus, despite Sadik-Khan’s progressive roots and instincts, and her commendable efforts to “pedestrianize” New York’s streets and nudge the city toward a more human-friendly (as opposed to car-friendly) environment, this latest battleground in the Transit Wars could tarnish her reputation and compromise her vision. In other words, the”BRT” campaign might represent a serious booby trap. The bigger picture here is yet another confrontation between the old-line, Robert Moses-era ideologicial commitment to rubber tires and petroleum propulsion vs. the specific benefits and advantages offered by electric light rail, especially streetcars as Reconnecting America has communicated so well, with Sadik-Khan’s leadership.

Now, many transit advocates who recognize the proven capabilities of rail believe that, in NYC, Sadik-Khan needs to take a firm stand on the side of rational, 21st-century public transport planning. This means diplomatically or otherwise fingering the fatuous claims for “BRT” for what they are, acknowledging the drawbacks of “BRT” with respect to the heavy demands of a mega-city’s traffic corridors, and presenting both surface light rail/streetcar and grade-separated rail metro (i.e., subway) public transit as the right fit for NYC’s needs in these kinds of high-volume central-city applications.

Bus Raid Transit – A transit Panacea or a money pit?

Phileas woes in Istanbul.

 

Many politicians are calling for Bus Rapid Transit, but really haven’t a clue what they are talking about. Internationally, BRT describes guided buses and/or large busway networks, but in Vancouver, BRT tends to mean B-Line style, limited stop, bus service. What is quietly forgotten is that BRT has not, except in third world countries where there are little affordable alternatives, fared well. Even Ottawa’s famed busways saw over a 14% drop in ridership in the first decade of operation resulting in Ottawa’s transit officials switch from BRT to LRT. The following is from a transit specialist who belongs to the LRTA.

In ‘Buses’ magazine, there an article about the Dutch Phileas buses (BRT) on the Istanbul BRT system. These are virtually brand new (not even two years old) 26 metre double-articulated parallel-type diesel hybrid vehicles which feature doors on both sides.

It seems that despite their young age most of the fleet of 50 have already had to be taken out of service with major problems which include difficulties in climbing a steep hill and breakages to the vehicles’ suspension system. The matter is so serious that it has even been discussed in Parliament.

Apparently the hill climbing issue is that the buses are designed to climb a 2.5% gradient at 40km/h, but the people of Istanbul see this as being too slow / want them to do so more quickly. The word on the street is that the buses were designed to run in a flat country (like Holland) and are not suitable for locations where heavily loaded buses are required to climb even gentle hills. Wondering aloud, I’d suggest that this is a question of available power, and that they should trial direct electric traction (trolleybus) as a way to improve their climbing speed – although not knowing the road configuration I cannot know for sure if this would be the whole solution.

The problems with the suspension seem to have been caused by overcrowding. As we know, buses normally have a maximum capacity limit on the number of passengers allowed to travel; these vehicles were designed to carry up to 230 passengers – although at peak times loads of 280 are often carried. As a contrast with steel rail transports (trains, trams, streetcars, etc) it often happens that at the busiest times the sheer numbers of people travelling will see them ‘packed in like sardines in a tin can’. It seems that the same has been happening with the Phileas buses, especially when there are football (soccer) matches at a stadium along the route the buses serve.

In the meantime the fleet of 200 CapaCity and other buses are having to work extra hard to cover for these buses – and plans to buy 50 more Phileas buses have been put on hold.

————–

According to Wikipedia the buses breaking down also caused severe problems because of the single-track nature of their dedicated right of way, blocking it so that other passes could not pass.

A 2007 Presentation on Valley Rail – by the Light Rail Committee

First, before any discussion about rail transit, including Light Rail Transit, we must define LRT and other transit modes. The following is a brief descriptions of various transit modes advocated as solutions for transit in the region.

Commuter rail:

Locomotive hauled rail coaches or diesel or electric multiple unit trains, catering specifically to peak hour transit demands.

Passenger rail:

Any regularly scheduled passenger rail service.

 Light Rail Transit:

 A rail mode, that economically bridges the gap between what passenger loads that can be economically carried by bus and that of a metro, between 2,000 and 20,000 persons per hour per direction. Comes from the English term light railway or a railway light in costs. LRT is able to operate in mixed traffic on city streets, its own reserved rights-of-way, or on mainline railways. LRT can be built as a simple streetcar or as a light metro, and can combine any and all of the previous examples on one route.

The metro family, including light metro:

 A rail mode that operates on segregated rights-of-ways, due to longer rakes of passenger vehicles operating at close headways. Metros generally operate on elevated guideways or in subways and has more intensive signaling, sometimes including driverless operation. Metros are built to cater to large passenger volumes, in excess of 300,000 or more passengers per route (line) per direction per day.

 Bus rapid transit (BRT):

Any limited stop bus service including guided bus and buses using busways.

The problem:

The population of the Fraser Valley is growing at an unprecedented rate, roads and highways are congested and pollution in the upper regions of the valley is increasing rapidly. The provincial government in 1980, forced the proprietary SkyTrain light metro system upon the GVRD instead of previously planned for light rail. For the cost of LRT going from downtown Vancouver to Lougheed Mall, Whalley, and Richmond Centre, the region got SkyTrain from downtown Vancouver to New Westminster. Some $5 billion later we have SkyTrain to Whalley and the Millennium line, the only metro in the world that goes nowhere to nowhere. The annual subsidy for SkyTrain is now over $200 million annually and has given rise to the myth that “we do not have the density for rapid transit“. We have plenty of density for LRT, we never did have the density for metro.

 The provincial government has again forced another, now $2.5+ billion, metro system onto TransLink, on a route without sufficient density to provide the ridership needed to justify its construction costs, which in turn will further increase the annual subsidy for metro in the GVRD.

 TransLink, with absolutely no experience with modern LRT is planned for a hybrid light metro/rail line costing well over $100 million per km to build, later fiddled………..

https://railforthevalley.wordpress.com/2008/12/26/can-translinks-business-cases-be-trusted/

……….. a business plan to support SkyTrain light-metro; again on a route that doesn’t have the sufficient ridership to justify the line and again will further increase the annual subsidy for the GVRD’s grand railway projects.

 Because of the huge cost for TransLink’s rail transit, the provincial government claims that there isn’t the density for rapid transit in the Fraser Valley and has embarked on a $4.5 billion “Gateway” highways and bridge program. Problem is new highways and bridges only attract more traffic and soon highways become congested – again!

A Note on Density:

Many people, including TransLink confuse density with ridership. Density is the number of people living per square km. in a region and ridership is the number of people using transit. People only will use public transit if the public transit services their travel needs and if transit doesn’t serve where “I” want to go, “I” will not use it.

 What TransLink and the GVRD are trying to do is increase density near a SkyTrain routes and hope that the sheer numbers brought by higher density will provide the ridership for their metro. Sadly what has happened is that yes, more people are using SkyTrain, but even more people are using the car! One can densify all one wants but if public transit doesn’t serve the needs of the population, people will not use it.

 Many smaller European cities operate extensive light rail networks and carry large volumes of customers because the public transit services where people want to go. The key is build more  rail transit, serving more destinations, but built it cheaply!

The Karlsruhe Solution:Karlsruhe, Germany, with a regional population on par with the Fraser Valley has become famous in the urban-transportation field for its pioneering dual-system Stadtbahn “tram-trains” that run both on city streetcar tracks and on railroad lines shared with normal passenger and freight trains, in what is now known as the Karlsruhe Model. 

The first step in this development came with the extension of the previously-existing Albtalbahn, an electric suburban light-rail line that runs southward from Karlsruhe to Bad Herrenalb and Ittersbach. In 1979, it was extended through the center of Karlsruhe on city streetcar tracks, then northward to Neureut, where it shares tracks with freight trains on a lightly-used branch of Deutsche Bahn (DB). Further track-sharing allowed the line to be extended to Hochstetten in 1989. This DB branch uses diesel power, so the shared sections were electrified with 750V DC to accommodate the light-rail (Stadtbahn) trains.

The success of this project stimulated interest in converting some of the DB’s regional passenger services to Stadtbahn lines and running them into the city on streetcar tracks also. This would have significant advantages for passengers:

They would no longer have to transfer between trains and streetcars at the main railroad station (Hauptbahnhof) or other stations on the fringes of the city, such as at Durlach.

Because light-rail trains can accelerate more quickly than conventional trains, running time could be reduced. Alternatively, more stops could be made, so that fewer passengers would have to drive or take connecting buses to reach the outer stations.

The first dual-system Stadtbahn service began operation in 1992, between Karlsruhe and Bretten, on what is now part of route S4. It was a huge success, with ridership increasing a whopping 475% in a few weeks. New routes and extensions have followed . The total length of the AVG’s routes is now about 470 km (291 miles), making it one of the largest passenger rail operators in Germany after DB. The “tram-train” longest run is now a 210km (130 miles) service from Öhringen through central Karlsruhe! So successful is the Karlsruhe “tram-train” or interurban, the DB now operates with trams in the region!

Will Karlsruhe work here?

The answer is yes, but the federal and provincial governments must take the lead in passing legislation to compel regional railways to allow such operation, just as what happened in Germany. If we want to reduce congestion and pollution, we must build a viable transit alternative, the Karlsruhe model provides an extensive ‘rail’ network at a far less cost, tens of billions of dollars, than the Vancouver RAV or SkyTrain metro models. To build 100 km of SkyTrain would cost about $9 billion dollars but with the Karlsruhe “tram-train” concept, 100 km. could cost as little as $800 million! Much less if diesel light rail is used!

In an era where European transit planners are continually trying to reduce the cost of new rail transit schemes, TransLink’s planners do the opposite, reveling in the idea that rail’ transit becomes better as one throws more money at it! Economy is not in TransLink’s lexicon.

Kevin Falcon’s TransLink Mk. 2 will continue to plan for hugely expensive subways in Vancouver and just leave transit crumbs for the rest. Vancouver now has nearing completion, a $2.5+ billion subway on two transit routes (98-B and Cambie St.) that could muster less than 40,000 customers a day. Now the City of Vancouver wants a multi-billion dollar subway under Broadway and what Vancouver wants, Vancouver gets! To fund Vancouver’s next subway, TransLink needs the tax base of the Fraser Valley to Hope and as far as Squamish.

There are affordable rail options for the Fraser Valley and it’s time for Valley politicians convey the message to Victoria and Ottawa that we do have the density for light rail; we can afford light rail; we want light rail; and no, no more hugely expensive metro’s and subways for Vancouver and its neighbours!

Chilliwack station

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT ASSOCIATION Discussion Document 73 March 2009

 

The following, though written for an English audience is pertinent to our current transit debates and maybe of some interest to those advocating rail transit here.

 

FALSE INFORMATION USED TO DESCRIBE A TRANSIT SCHEME

 

Introduction

 

This document is partly designed to correct a practice of using false information regarding transit modes. A striking example is the continued reference to Leeds Supertram as a failed project. The government had already labelled it as “not value for money” but did not provide any explanation to justify this statement. Going back to basic descriptions appears to be the best way forward.

 

  Buses:

The British public have already demonstrated that where buses are used as the principle transit mode in a transport system, they (the public) will look around for a suitable alternative, unhelpful to city centre shopkeepers (less customers). The bus though is a vital component in an integrated transit system by providing feeder services to either a tram route or a suburban railway station and also on routes with low patronage.

 Trolleybuses:

 

In some places (such as Bradford) hilly routes are better served by trolleybuses because they can improve on the limited performance of the diesel buses. No trolleybus routes exist in the UK at present. This is probably because they are vulnerable to snowy conditions. 

Supertrams (Light Rail or streetcar):TRAMS:

Most places in western Europe operate trams as a vital component in an integrated transit system. On very busy routes they can operate as a coupled pair with a loaded passenger capacity equating to about seven buses. A bonus for the operator is that the two trams only require one driver. Metrolink in Manchester couples its trams in peak periods.

Suburban Railways:

Although the cost of providing a local railway service is mostly cushioned by sharing tracks with Inter City services, the tracks are often distant from populated areas. Also, a city terminal often involves a walk to a shopping centre.

Tram-Trains:

These can connect rural areas to CBD without a change of vehicle, a service with considerable advantages. The passenger is often unaware of any change in the mode taking place and the infrastructure costs are relatively small. Saarbrucken (Germany) could be useful as a role model. In most cases, the vehicle has an outward appearance resembling a tram but hidden equipment facilitates the actual changeover.

Transport consultants have recommended a connecting tram service between Leeds and Harrogate via Horsforth. This was rejected by the Government which decided on a two year trial period between Huddersfield and Sheffield, completely on railway tracks.

Summary – Supertram advantages

1 Can quickly swallow a large crowd.

2 A large standing load saves some being left behind (as on a bus route) having to wait for the next bus.

3 Many doors permit a quick entrance and exit.

4 Gives a quality ride.

5 Permanence attracts passengers.

6 One tram stop can accept many routes. No walk required when changing route.

7 Can operate at high speed on segregated tracks.

8 Clean operation at point of use.

9 Can feed the braking energy back into the overhead line.

10 Some systems operate completely from renewable energy sources.

11 Can safely mix with pedestrians in precincts.

Footnote:

Many citizens supporting mixed bus and tram systems will already know well the trams  good points. This document is aimed at people who may have never experienced a modern tram ride and may not support the tramway concept. 

The above eleven points could help them to appreciate the importance to Leeds (and elsewhere) of an integrated transport system.

Examples of Supertram type operation can be seen and experienced in five British cities: Manchester; Sheffield; Birmingham to Wolverhampton; London (Croydon) and Nottingham. In effect only five cities offer the choice of good quality transit to the car.

 Prepared by F A Andrews LRTA Assistant Publicity Officer

Brisbane Reality Check: The high cost of “cheap” busways – From the Light Rail Now Folks

The following is from the Light Rail now folks in the U.S.A. It certainly blows the lid off the BRT crowd, when it comes to the claim that BRT is cheaper than light-rail.

When one hears Kevin Falcon or other Valley Liberal MLA’s claim that BRT must come first because it is cheaper than LRT, remind them of this posting and the cost for BRT in Brisbane Australia!

The ultimate in bus rapid transit (BRT) guided bus or O-Bahn

Light Rail Now! NewsLog
5 June 2009

Brisbane Reality Check: The high cost of “cheap” busways

In the ongoing battle between backers of light rail transit (LRT) and the rather blurry concept dubbed “bus rapid transit” (“BRT” ), Brisbane (capital of Queensland, and Australia’s third-largest ciry, on the country’s eastern coast) is definitely one of the hottest flashpoints, with Queenslland Premier Anna Bligh touting “BRT” busways as costing about half as much to build as LRT, and Transport Minister John Mickel advancing the merits of a “tramway-style” LRT system.

First, some background on Brisbane’s public transport system…

The city’s pervasive and efficient light rail electric tramway (streetcar) network was scrapped in the 1960s during the worldwide Transit Devastation era (when most city officials and planners were doing all they could to “motorize” their local travel and promote public dependency on personal motor vehicles running on public roadways).

In this process, as the electric tramways were ripped out, they were replaced by motor buses running on petroleum fuel (believed to be forever cheap and abundant). Fortunately, Brisbane’s legacy regional passenger rail (RPR) transit system relained, to evolve into today’s efficient Citytrain system, reaching some 382 km (237 miles) of route throughout the metro area.

In recent years, the need for a more rapid, medium-capacity surface transit system has sparked a debate between advocates of light rail transit (LRT) – basically, a re-introduction of tramways and “BRT”, operating on both dedicated busways and streets. In 2000, “BRT” won the initial round, with the opening of the first of the region’s busways. Now 19.3 km (12 miles) of busway serve the Brisbane metro area, carrying some 100,000 weekday rider-trips. Promoters are claiming supposedly lower costs and greater “flexibility” as reasons to favor more “BRT” development rather than a light rail transit (LRT) system, proposed as an alternative by rail advocates.
One reason for the high cost of busways is the need for passing lanes at stations to enable capacity approaching that of rail but high ridership results in serious queuing of buses. Imagine your waiting time if you’re trying to catch your bus home after work, but it’s somewhere in that “conga line” of “BRT” buses trying to access the station!

In Brisbane as elsewhere, proponents of “BRT” typically mix-and-match design criteria and lowball investment estimates in their campaign to assert that “BRT” is “just like light rail, but cheaper”

The claim that busways are “cheaper” than light rail merits examining with considerable skepticism as Light Rail Now has done repeatedly, in numerous articles on this website.

See: “Bus Rapid Transit” Analyses and Articles

In terms of capital investment cost, our research of Brisbane’s busway projects hardly justify the claim of “low cost” compared with LRT.

Obtaining the costs of Brisbane’s busway projects is not particularly easy the public agencies involved don’t publicize them to facilitate access. However, thefollowing two documents (recently available) have proven to be an extremely helpful source of basic information needed:

Public Transport Mode Selection: A Review of International Practice
http://etcproceedings.org/paper/download/1679

State of Queensland (Queensland Transport) 2009 Busways
http://www.transport.qld.gov.au/Home/Projects_and_initiatives/Projects/Busways/
Busways

Splicing together data from these two sources, we’ve been able to ascertain the actual cost, converted to current (2009) US dollars, of several of Brisbane’s major busway projects, as follows:

South East Busway (completed 2001):
15,6 km (9.7 mi), US$421 million
$27 million/km
$43 million/mile

 Inner Northern Busway (completed 2008):
4.7 km (2.9 mi), US$408 million
$87 million/km
$141 million/mile

Northern Busway Project (currently under way):
1.2 km (0.7 mile), US$158 million
$132 million/km
$214 million/mile

These unit capital costs seem staggering, and it leaves little wonder why they are not more readily publicized by the authorities and “BRT” promoters.

These costs are particularly striking in comparison with the costs of LRT lines on exclusive rights-of-way (comparable to busways). There is no project in Ausralia in such an alignment (the Adelaide LRT was an upgrade of an existing railway alignment), but two projects in US urban areas could be considered comparable:

 Charlotte Lynx LRT, South corridor (completed 2007):
9.6 mi (15.5 km), US$496 million
$32 million/km
$52 million/mile

Sacramento Folsom LRT extension (completed 2004):
7.4 mi (11.9 km)
$25 million/km
$41 million/mile

(Again, all costs above expressed in 2009 US dollars.)

These comparative costs would certainly seem to call into strong question the claim of “BRT” promoters in Brisbane and elsewhere that busways are significantly “lower-cost” investments than LRT lines.

Premier Campbell & Kevin Falcon ‘flips the bird’ to the valley

Gordon Campbell, like all politicians, likes to monument build and with good ‘polling’ numbers has promised a ‘monumental’ 10 lane bridge with all the whistles and bangs to target the car driver in May’s provincial election.  The $3 billion plus mega bridge and highways project has nothing to do about good transportation or planning, rather it is all about hucksterism and vote buying by a government that cares little about the environment, global warming, peak oil, and the agricultural land reserve.

The talk of a Langley to Burnaby BRT or rapid bus taking 23 minutes is about as useless a statistic as you can get, but the media keep eating it up. The fact is BRT  doesn’t work, as it has proven not to attract the motorist from the car. Can anyone point to a successful BRT operation? Yet, Falcon prattles on, knowing that the media doesn’t do its homework and just prints ‘verbatim’ what is said, factual or not.

Rail transit is mentioned, but at a later date, “sometime in the future when there is the capacity”. This is just ‘spin doctoring’, to placate the many rail groups lobbying for ‘rail’ transit in the valley and the present government has absolutely no intention to build ‘rail’ transit in the valley. No express highway bridge to date, in the world, has been retrofitted for ‘rail’ transit after it has been opened. No government will eliminate two road lanes for rail and the premier and minister of transportation are disingenuous claiming this will happen.

What Valley politicians and voters should keep in mind that the $1.8 billion dollar difference, from the original twinned bridge concept to mega-bridge, would fund a deluxe electrified Vancouver to Chilliwack interurban, with a new Fraser River Rail Bridge, independent LRT lines in Surrey, Langley, and Abbotsford, serving the Abbotsford International Airport!

Premier Campbell and Kevin Falcon have effectively given a ‘Trudeau’ style salute to all valley residents and taxpayers.

The new Port Mann Bridge – A bridge too big!

The provincial governments announcement of a new 10 lane bridge, replacing the Port Mann bodes ill for implementing good transportation planning for the Fraser Valley. The real winners are the ‘roads lobby’, the trucking industry, and the land developers, as the announced bridge caters directly to their demands.

What the new bridge does show, is the utter failure of the SkyTrain metro system to alleviate auto congestion in the region,with a cost of over $100 million/km. SkyTrain is just too expensive to build in quantity to create the ‘rail‘ network to attract the motorist from the car. The new bridge, a clear winner for car drivers, shows that Gordon Campbell’s transportation policy is strictly ‘rubber on asphalt’.  Rapid bus or BRT, is the roads-lobby’s favorite transit gimmick, because BRT buses need new highways to operate, but what has been politely overlooked is BRT’s dismal record in attracting ridership, especially the all important motorist from the car. Campbell’s and Falcon’s call for express buses and/or BRT, operating on express bus lanes on the bridge is strictly government propaganda; remembering that in 1986, when the Alex Fraser Bridge was opened, the two lanes reserved for express busses lasted for about six months.

The same is true of putting ‘rail‘ transit on the bridge at a later date  and unless the rails are laid during construction it will never happen, unlike the Seattle bus tunnel where rails were laid during its construction and now in use with the new LRT system nearing completion. There is not one single example in the world of an express highway bridge closing traffic lanes and laying track for ‘rail‘ transit. Campbell and his sidekick, Kevin Falcon, speaks ‘transit‘ nonsense strictly for 10 second sound bites for radio and TV.

What the bridge will do is exert great pressure on Valley municipalities to plough under more farmland to build houses, increasing population and further putting pressure on our already over-stressed transportation infrastructure. Like the Sea to Sky highway, the new Port Mann Bridge is boon to developers, which should come as no surprise with a developer friendly government. Within five years from opening, the new bridge will be at capacity, what then? With no coherent transportation plan gridlock and traffic chaos will return with a vengeance.

What the new bridge has done is take money away from other important and necessary transportation projects such as the much needed Puttallo Bridge replacement; the Fraser River Rail Bridge replacement, and the return of the interurban.

Gordon Campbell’s Liberal provincial government has played its cards for future transportation planning in the Fraser Valley and light rail is not in the hand.

Bus Rapid Transit or BRT – Does it deliver?

The bus lobby are quick to jump on the Bus Rapid Transit or BRT bandwagon, yet fail to point to any one BRT  that has attracted the all important motorist from the car. While new LRT/tram operations have seen major jumps in ridership, ridership figures for new BRT systems have been disappointing. Ottawa is on record though as experiencing between 1981 and 1996 a ridership decline of 18% which probably played a major part in that city’s decision to stop building busways and to concentrate in future on diesel light rail and LRT expansion.

The following is a “Discussion Document” from the Light Rail Transit Association and contains, not so much useful information, rather how comparisons between LRT and BRT can be skewed to favour buses.

“MASS TRANSIT : BUS RAPID TRANSIT SHOWS PROMISE” (1)

INTRODUCTION

This discussion document will deal principally with an attitude change by the US General Accounting Office (GAO), which has sparked widespread controversy and criticism for what many professionals have described as an amalgam of misinformation, factual errors, serious anomalies and, in many instances, questionable data. The GAO report was written at the behest of several congressional representatives, some of whom played front- line roles in boosting highway expansion and opposing major transit projects.

“It should be noted that much of the data included in the GAO report has been proven to be faulty and must be regarded as highly controversial and not accepted as reliable by a consensus within the transportation planning profession” (2).

ANALYSIS OF GAO’S REPORT (3)

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has begun to support the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) concept as an alternative to building light rail systems, and promotes this policy with the slogan “Think Rail, Use Buses”. A figure used to suggest that buses can provide equivalent attributes to rail, but at lower cost, is deceptive. An average (BRT) construction cost figure often includes in the performance characteristics the simple marking of street lanes for 12 mph service, in no way rapid transit. The equivalent average given for LRT included subway or tunnel (included in a few systems) but was omitted from the BRT average cost. The costly BRT subway in Seattle for instance was inadvertently omitted from the study.

That relatively few BRT projects were ready for funding was claimed to be because of the newness of the concept, among other reasons. BRT is hardly new, being first known in Newark in 1938. A second known BRT was on the Ardmore route of the Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co, converted from LRT in 1967. Its effect turned out to be an increase in operational costs and a 15% loss of patronage. This result was consistent with transit officials noting the poor public image of buses. A comparatively recent example of this followed in Northern Virginia when their BRT opened in 1970 and then continued to lose passengers ever since the 1980 energy crisis. Patronage is now down to about 67%.

POOR RESULTS FROM PITTSBURGH

Pittsburgh’s first BRT was opened in 1977 with an estimated patronage of 32 000 each weekday. The service now averages 14 500. The current West BRT in Pittsburgh was estimated to attract 50 000 weekday passengers but so far has attracted about 6 000 (4). This compares with an independent estimate for rail operation which forecast 20 000 weekday passengers.

OPERATING COSTS

GAO reported the hourly cost on selected bus systems as USD84.72, as against USD161.48 on LRT in the same cities. The capacity figures used were 50 on buses and 110 on LRT. A simple calculation puts a bus passenger cost at USD1.69 per hour as against USD1.47 for an LRT passenger. On a mileage basis, an actual cost for an express bus in Dallas, the only place where the data was segregated out, was given as 46 cents per passenger mile. It is of interest to look a little deeper, at either San Diego or Saint Louis for instance, where the LRT passenger mile cost in 1998 was 18.5 cents. Were these well-performing systems deliberately left out ?

GAO’s fig.7 is replete with errors (5) and is very much at odds with the FTA’s 1998 figures. The cost in Los Angeles per bus hour is not USD56 but USD93.72 and per LRT hour is not USD434 but USD253.94. This goes some way towards invalidating the GAO findings.

RIDERSHIP

One of GAO’s findings was that the top capacities of BRT and LRT were quite similar. This though is not borne out by fact with busways averaging about 15 000 per weekday as against 29 000 on LRT. The Blue line to the CBD in Los Angeles carries well over 63 000 and is the reason why “transit officials” told GAO that passengers prefer rail.

SPEED

GAO’s 56 mph BRT speed must be without any stops for passengers. The LRT figure is not unrealistic at 16 mph for slower lines making stops and with the turnaround time at each terminus included, but 20 mph would be better. GAO’s speed for LRT in Denver as 11 mph was distorted because this is for the downtown section of the route. Full route speed is 23 mph. The 35 mph bus speed only applies to an isolated freeway section. The entire Green line LRT in Los Angeles averages 35 mph, which includes stops and a daily load of 33 000. LRVs, although with have good acceleration and, are also good on grades. Bus drivers sometimes have to turn off the air conditioning to climb grades at reasonable speeds, not a problem with electric LRVs.

IMPORTANT OMISSIONS BY GAO

Passengers don’t respond well to bus flexibility; – GAO assumes that the BRT title adds incentive to bus use; – the change from express bus to a stopping bus in Denver more than doubled patronage; – poor ridership on Detroit’s people mover shows that passengers prefer a park + ride served by LRT; – for a given mileage buses have an 80% increase in reported injuries; – the air quality is improved in CBDs when transportation is with LRVs.

PURPLE LINE SWITCH HAS CAUSED A FEW SURPRISES (6).

Surprise and concern has been expressed after the Maryland Transportation Secretary’s announcement that the proposed Purple Line light rail route is under serious consideration to be a future rapid bus system instead. Described as a Super Street Train, it would be a cheaper and more mobile alternative to rail and, although there is a history of consumers preferring light rail to traditional buses, “we would like people to keep an open mind”.

CONCLUSION

A discussion document on a topical transit mode would fail in its purpose if it only looked at quality as a function of economy and became totally obsessed with low price, and consequently failed to address the many disadvantages of an economy- based decision. A transit system with low passenger appeal contributes little towards solving a mobility and traffic congestion problem. This has recently been dramatically demonstrated in Leeds where, despite two new guided bus corridors, the city is about to install a Supertram system.

REFERENCES

1. “LIGHT RAIL NOW” has produced a report – GAO’s “BRT” REPORT ERRORS, ANOMALIES, MISINFORMATION – with a sub-heading “LIGHT RAIL PROGRESS – DECEMBER 2002” (www.lightrailnow.org/myths/m_brt002.htm). The GAO report (www.gao.gov/new.items/d01984.pdf) was dated September 2001.
2. LIGHT RAIL PROGRESS – page 2. (see above for details)
3. Presented to a meeting of the RESEARCH BOARD COMMITTEE A1E12, Light Rail, in January 2002 by Edson L Tennyson PE, Transportation Consultant and former Deputy Secretary of Transportation for the State of Pennsylvania.
4. LIGHT RAIL PROGRESS – page 4. (see reference 1 for details)
5. LIGHT RAIL PROGRESS – page 5. (see reference 1 for details)
6. Michael H Cottman – Washington Post Staff Writer – Washington Post page B02 – Friday 7th March 2003.

Produced by F A Andrews – for the LRTA Development Group – March 2003